Hanoch Dagan and Avihay Dorfman have recently reminded us, 9 express a public understanding of the individual moral, not just legal, obligations of individual employers to treat their employees and their candidates for employment fairly. To discriminate in employment in violation of those laws, then, is not simply an act that may give rise to a cause of action for reinstatement or damages, as per Justice Roberts's suggestion. 10 It is also to break faith with and to undermine the shared national project of creating a world of equal opportunity and full participation that is free of racism and sexism and their related effects, and it is to perform an individual moral wrong in one's personal contractual relations with one's employees or with those who seek one's employment. It is, in other words, both a civic and political breach as well as a moral and contractual wrong.
Again, this is no trifling matter. The obligations of nondiscrimination grounded in the Civil Rights Acts that are set aside by virtue of the ministerial exemption in order to make room for religious autonomy are themselves exemplary of both shared communal obligations to integrate previously excluded outsiders in our workforces and schools and of individual obligations of contractors-in this case employers-to act in accordance with some minimal level of fairness in their individual employment-related contractual relations. To exempt an entire and sizeable class of employers-churches, mosques, temples, and church-, mosque-and temple-affiliated schools, and presumably hospitals as well-when making a sizable number of employment-related decisions from the reach of those laws is therefore no small thing either. These employers in particular, 9 Put differently, it is not at all clear why our nation's ministers, rabbis, and imams, whether they are ministering or teaching, should not be drawn from the full and diverse
American public rather than one racially or sexually determined segment of it, no less than are our nation's public and private school teachers, police forces, firefighters, professors, health care professionals, service providers, and retail, factory, and construction forces. It is even less clear why the churches, synagogues, and mosques that hire and fire them should be explicitly permitted to do so partly on the basis of their race, sex, age, ethnicity, or able-bodied-ness. Church-affiliated employers, no less than, and perhaps quite a bit more than, police departments, firefighters, public and private universities, hospitals, hotels, restaurants, retail outlets, service providers, construction firms, and factories, one would think, should be fully committed to those ideals and required to abide by their commitments.
Nevertheless, some of the contributors to this volume and now a number of First Amendment scholars as well see a paramount need for religious employers to enjoy institutional independence from these obligations, and the Supreme Court has now held,
in Hosanna-Tabor, that in a broad swath of cases they are right to prioritize that need.
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Churches and church-affiliated institutions must be free of these obligations of nondiscrimination, at least when hiring ministers, all the better to carry out their religious mission, according to the Court's opinion in Hosanna-Tabor. 12 More broadly, the 11 132 S. Ct. at 706. 12 132 S. Ct. at 706; Garnett, supra note 2, at 29-32.
Church must, in effect, maintain some degree of independent sovereignty over its ministerial workforce, and hence must be free of invasive governmental regulations, to be worthy of the obedience it asks of its congregants. 13 And the state, if it is to be true to the pluralist ambitions obliquely referenced in the American Constitution, at least according to Richard Garnett's contribution to this volume, must, in turn, recognize the Church's right to do so.
14 The Lutheran Church-affiliated school in Hosanna-Tabor must, therefore, be free of the obligations imposed on employers generally to not engage in discriminatory conduct when filling its ministerial staff. Our constitutional order itself, no less than the religious practices it promises to protect, apparently requires as much.
15
In this brief comment I want to suggest that the "Freedom of the Church" to ignore the dictates of our various Civil Rights Acts, whether in the ministerial context or more broadly, created or at least newly discovered by the Court in What I wish to stress here, however, is that exit rights also come with costs to our national community, not the least of which is that they undermine the aspirations of the civil society from which exit is sought. Those aspirations include, in this case, the communitarian ideals of inclusiveness, participation, and integration that are imperfectly embodied in the civil rights laws themselves. For that reason alone, these "exit" or "optout" rights, including the ministerial exemption recognized and then broadened in Hosanna-Tabor, are profoundly troubling.
The first part of this comment quickly sketches the logical structure and the anticommunitarian significance of exit rights generally, using Hosanna-Tabor as an example.
The second part contrasts the separatist and pluralist ideals motivating exit rights with
those that animate what I hope is at least an equally familiar, and arguably older, paradigm of rights. Our civil rights, I will suggest, beginning with the original 1860s
Civil Rights Acts themselves, and then extending through to the 1960s Civil Rights Acts of a half century back, and now including as well the various civil rights and civil rights movements of contemporary life-the Violence Against Women Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Affordable Health Care Act, the Equal Marriage campaign, and the panoply of movements for civil rights for immigrants-that have all generally aimed to guarantee participation and inclusion in the larger national community rather than rights to opt out of that community. Civil rights are, I will suggest, rights to enter, rather than rights to exit. Their goal is not to permit the flowering of separate sovereign communities, but rather, to create a national community of broad based participation and civic equality. They are not just different in that respect from exit rights; they are often oppositional: "civil rights" and "exit rights" are very often in tension. The second part briefly explores that tension.
The conclusion suggests that exit rights, including the "Freedom of the Church" articulated and defended in Hosanna-Tabor, are a threat to not only the specific civil rights with which they conflict but also to the ideals of community and full inclusion which our various civil rights traditions only imperfectly represent, but to an unappreciated degree, also constitute. We should therefore recognize as one cost of the "Freedom of the Church" the tragic consequences of expanding the list of various rights of exit and exemption that we grant individuals and institutions both. I don't see that recognition in the essays in this collection that celebrate the "Freedom of the Church." It is absolutely nowhere in the Court's decision that recognized or created it.
The Freedom of the Church as a Right to Exit
Exit rights generally give their holders rights to exit from societal and civic obligations that would be otherwise imposed upon them by the state and to retreat instead into miniaturized sub-cultural worlds, in which the authority of the federal or state governments is set aside, so as to permit the flowering of a different and more private sovereign authority. Alternately, depending on the right, the authority of the church over its congregants, or of God over believers, or of parents over their children, or of doctors over patients, or of homeowners against possible intruders, or, in cases involving individual conscientious objection or individual consumer preferences, the sovereignty of an individual's conscience, political beliefs, or consumptive choices over his or her own actions or inactions that would otherwise be prescribed by a general law of the state.
Exit rights, wherever they are recognized, don't seek to enhance individual liberty within civil society by expanding or deepening the rights of individuals to participate in that society, as do, for example and by contrast, voting rights, some First Amendment rights, some Equal Protection Rights, and, as I will argue below, virtually all of our civil rights under the various Civil Rights Acts. Rather, they seek to enhance individual liberty by expanding the right of the rights-holder to exit civil society and the complex of laws, tradeoffs, and reciprocal rights and obligations that in turn constitute some aspect of our society's legally constructed social contract. In each case in which an exit right is recognized, the individual or corporate entity is given a right to refuse to participate, rather than rights to participate, in some legally constructed and shared project of civil society.
Exit rights are grounded in various legal or constitutional texts, and as such, their legal authorization differs, but they share a common and two-pronged moral justification.
First, an exit right, virtually regardless of its textual foundation, is justified by the purported importance-moral, political, or otherwise-of the non-governmental sovereign to which allegiance of the sub-community that will be covered by the exit right is owed. 21 Second, the recognition by the state of the separate sovereignty the exit right creates is then justified, in turn, by a pluralist understanding of our foundational constitutional principles: according to the exit right holder-or his, her, or its advocaterespect must be owed the integrity and insularity of those separate sovereign spaces and the separate set of authorities and reciprocal obligations of obedience that are found within them, in substantial part so as to maximize individual liberty. 22 As such, exit rights, according to their defenders, both expand our liberties and also sensibly recognize the splintered nature of our loyalties. . 22 See Garnett, supra note 2, at 16-18; Galston, supra note 15.
Hosanna-Tabor
sought, and obtained, an exemption from otherwise binding law so that it could exercise its independent authority, free of those civic obligations, when firing a disabled ministerial employee who might otherwise have been protected against her wrongful discharge by the Americans with Disabilities Act. 23 The exit right in Hosanna-Tabor was grounded in an expansive reading of precedential authority under the First Amendment, but its moral and political justification, offered by commentators as well as the Court, is the argument briefly sketched above and common to all exit rights: the Church is a separate sovereign authority which should enjoy institutional freedom from state control, the state's deferential respect for which is broadly consistent with a pluralist understanding of our Constitutional structure. Thus, like all exit rights, the right to the ministerial exception created in Hosanna-Tabor establishes a separate sovereignty, the justification for which lies first in the value of the Church's institutional authority, and second in the merits of a pluralist understanding of our constitutional traditions.
Exit rights, so understood, have been proliferating over the last couple of decades.
Let me point to just a few additional examples. Lobby as in Hosanna-Tabor, the exit right-meaning both the particular right recognized in that case and the general exit rights defined by the RFRA more broadly-was justified on the two grounds identified above. First, the legitimacy and value of the separate sovereign authority of the rights holder's religious beliefs, and second, by a conception of constitutionalism that commits the state to a plural rather than unified political community. In both Hobby Lobby and Hosanna-Tabor, the Court created rights of religious believers to exit our civic society, rather than expand or recognize rights to participate in it.
26 134 S. Ct. 2751. The employer in Hobby Lobby had a religious objection to some of the covered forms of birth control, such that its participation in the dispensation of insurance that would cover the offending medical technologies, it believed, would implicate it in a grave wrong and thus burden its religious practices and beliefs. The Court held that that the corporation was protected by the RFRA, that the contraception mandate burdened the corporation's religious beliefs, and that while the state had a compelling interest in the dispensation of birth control through the employer-provided plans required by the ACA, it had not used the least restrictive means of furthering that interest, which might have better accommodated the corporate employer's religious beliefs and practices. The employer was therefore found exempt, under the auspices of the RFRA, from the obligations imposed by the ACA on all other employers to provide insurance with the full range of contractive options. children to public high schools-the very institution widely recognized as the heart of an inclusive and fully participatory civil society-as well as the right to exit any implied obligation to immerse themselves or their children in the mores of the dominant secular culture. 40 They were given that right, quite explicitly, in order to allow them to maintain the cultural insularity, authority, and in effect and intent both, the separate sovereignty of the Amish community. 41 Again the right, however textually authorized, was premised on the defining justification of exit rights generally: the value of the Amish community and a pluralist understanding of our constitutional traditions.
And finally, the "right to privacy" itself-a highly treasured victory of political or institutions-comes at the cost of equality for others. Exit rights quite explicitly allow some parts of the community to exercise dominion over other parts of the communityparts of the community which would otherwise be equal by virtue of the operation of the exited law. Thus, it is by virtue of exit rights that a state cannot "force" Church-affiliated employers to abide by otherwise agreed-upon antidiscrimination policies when hiring ministers, or some religious parents to send their children to public schools or even to publicly-regulated private ones, or a homeowner to put down his weaponry and rely on the police to protect his safety, or a woman to carry a fetus to term, or an individual to "buy into" a social scheme where the purpose is to spread the cost of health care for all.
All of this may look like, and might be, a gain in either individual or institutional freedom for those freed from those obligations. But it is also by virtue of those rights, and their sovereign-creating logic, that the state cannot protect the applicant of those ministerial positions from the Church-affiliated employer's willful power to discriminate, or the children of those religious parents from those parents' decision to inflict upon them a poor or non-existent education, or the fetus from the pregnant woman's choice to abort, or the intruder of the home of the armed homeowner from that homeowner's excessive use of lethal force, or the sick and impoverished health care seeker from inferior or nonexistent health insurance, which is in part a product of the healthy individual's refusal to participate in the cooperative scheme that would pay for it. By exempting some of us, but not others, and by protecting some of us, but not others, whatever else they do, exit rights thereby breed inequalities by depriving weaker parties of the protection of the law, leaving them to the discretionary authority of various private sovereigns.
Second, and virtually by definition, exit rights splinter our communities. They divide us up every which way. They divide us between those who are and those who aren't obligated; those who are and those who aren't exempt; those who are and those who aren't subject to the authority of the state; and, of course, those who are and those who aren't in turn protected by the state against the privately inflicted wrongs and harms which all of those separate sovereign authorities might inflict and for which, because of their exit rights, they are exempt from duties of recompense. And by virtue of these divisions, they move us, inexorably, as a rights-regarding national community, from an aspirational ideal of e pluribus unum, to that of e pluribus pluribus. From many, by the logic of exit rights, comes not one, but many. The pluralism so lauded by exit right celebrants-and on the political left and the political right-is a pluralism of profoundly hierarchic communities, in which authorities are all the more authoritative precisely because they are freed from obligations to the state and in which those from whom obedience is expected are all the more obedient, precisely because they are in turn stripped of the state's legal protections. But beyond the hierarchies, that pluralism is also simply a pluralism of separate communities. Exit rights come at a cost to our shared, national, communitarian aspirations. They come with a cost to civil society.
Is the gain in liberty of the individuals or institutions empowered by exit rights worth the sacrifice of either the equality or the communitarianism, or both, that is otherwise promised by the Rule of Law? It depends, of course, as suggested above, in part, on the wisdom or foolishness of the law from which exit is granted. It also depends, however, on the worthiness of the separate sovereign sphere, which the exit right creates.
A pluralist constitutional federation, after all, is only as good as the plural communities that constitute it. It is worth noting that slaveholders in the pre-bellum south also enjoyed what were in effect exit rights from the criminal law that otherwise forbade assaults, batteries, and false imprisonments in order to exercise the freedom to punish their slaves in the separate sovereignty of the master-slave relation.
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Patriarchal husbands' nineteenth century rights to "chastise" their errant wives were also exit rights from those same obligations. 48 In both cases, the sovereign in those private sovereign spheres exercised authority freed of the rules of criminal law that otherwise required all citizens to abstain from assaulting and battering or wrongfully imprisoning others. The pluralism that demanded respect for the independence of these separate sovereign spheres of slavery and patriarchy was not a pluralism we now nostalgically admire or wish to emulate.
We have, of course, rejected the legitimacy of the particular "separate sovereignties" of slaveholders over slaves and of husbands over wives. We no longer constitutionally recognize the "institutional freedoms" of slavery and patriarchy. I am not equating the moral value of the church, or the home, or the pregnant woman, or the sovereign consumer with those institutions, or implying that the Court or other exit right celebrants are doing so. I do though want to insist that the logic of the rights by which 47 (1996) slaveholders and patriarchs exercised their morally repugnant power is shared by contemporary exit rights, whether sought by social conservatives on behalf of churches or by liberals on behalf of individuals. Exit rights, by definition, create separate sovereignties which themselves are breaches of the legal and social fabric that would otherwise unite us and would to some degree equalize us by so doing. Whether for good or ill, they create separate spheres of loyalty, of authority, and of obligation, which in turn splinter the larger civil and legal community from which exit is sought. They tear the national community apart. We should recognize this for the tragedy that it is.
Civil Rights as Rights to Enter
Exit rights contrast, sharply, with a quite different cluster, and perhaps a different generation, of rights that also have a distinguished pedigree, some overlap with our sharpen their contrast with exit rights. 50 The original founding-era understanding of the phrase "civil rights," in Tom Paine's influential language, was that they were that subset of the larger class of "natural rights," all of which enhance individual wellbeing but which do so by guaranteeing participation in those institutions of civil society that are a creation of law itself and that a "man cannot perfect on his own." 51 "Civil rights," by contrast to rights of conscience and speech, owe their very existence to law. They are a product of the social cooperation law represents, rather than a limit upon law's reach.
The original Civil Rights Act of 1866 52 quite perfectly reflected this Painean understanding. That Act protected against discrimination on the basis of race or prior condition of servitude the "civil rights" to contract, to write a will, to buy, possess, and transfer property, to sue for privately inflicted injuries in a court of law, to use public transportation, houses of hospitality, and public facilities, and perhaps quintessentially, to have the protection of the police force against private acts of violence 53 -all rights which owe their existence to law and legal institutions. Thus, that first generation of our civil rights-our "rights of belonging" or "rights of inclusion"-guaranteed that the right holder could participate in or could enter those civil institutions, such as contract, property, commerce, police protection, the courts of law, and the public square, all of which were themselves creations of law, rather than exclusively creations of nature, and would do so regardless of race. Twentieth and twenty-first century civil rights, including New Deal-era rights from the 1930s of laborers to minimum wages, safe workplaces, maximum hours, and the right to unionize, 54 as well as New Society 1960s-era rights of racial minorities and women to nondiscrimination from employers, schools, and sellers of real property, 55 late twentieth century rights of women to freedom from intimate violence 56 and of parents to medical leave for parental exigencies, 57 and twenty-first century rights of all citizens to affordable health care, 58 the still sought after rights of immigrants to fair treatment, 59 and to vote, to immigrate, to have children without fearing the loss of one's job, and to enjoy intimacy without fearing violence are all rights to enter something. They are rights to enter the worlds of commerce, property, places of accommodation, the public square, the court house, sites of employment, schools, the voting booth, the protection of the Rule of Law, and the institutions of marriage and family, health care, and citizenship. All of them are rights to enter civil society. They are rights to be included as participants in the social spaces that constitute it and that are constructed by law, that press toward the end of individual wellbeing, but that are constitutive of our very precious and always fragile civil society.
Conclusion
Exit rights often, although not invariably, are in conflict with civil rights of inclusion for a very specific reason: they undermine the civil institutions from which exit is sought in material as well as symbolic ways. The rights of religious fundamentalist parents to homeschool their children or of the Amish to end their children's education at the eighth grade don't simply exist side by side with a civil right to a public education.
Rather, exercise of the first right undermines the ideals of the second. The twenty-first century homeschooling parents, like the late twentieth century Amish, remove not only their children but their support from the civil society, the social community, and the social norms that are represented and constituted by our commitment to public schooling.
The individual choice not to buy health insurance likewise doesn't just exist side by side with the right to health care obliquely recognized by the ACA. Rather, the former exit right undermines the web of quasi-contractual coordination among those who are sick and those who are well-the legally coordinated purchases of insurance by all of us, by which the health care needs of the weakest among us are covered. The decision to purchase and use a gun for self-defense undermines the rights created by a social contract according to which we jointly delegate that work of protection against violence to a publicly funded police force. Police work is made considerably more difficult when the citizenry is fully armed and legally empowered to use those arms. The decision of a church-affiliated school or hospital not to abide by the strictures of Title VII or Title IX in staffing one's ministry similarly undermines the shared commitment to full participation and equal community embodied in those Civil Rights Acts, and the decision not to abide by a mandate to provide access to affordable birth control for one's employees undermines our commitment to the health, equalitarian, and libertarian goals of that aspect of the law.
Moreover, the jurisprudential and constitutional drift we're now undergoing toward not just particular rights to exit, but also toward the very idea of a right as being, in essence, a right to exit some aspect of civil society, is worrisome. It represents a tragic turn in our understanding of the value and nature of individual rights themselves. Our newly discovered exit rights from the last two terms-the ministerial exemption recognized and broadened in Hosanna-Tabor and the exemption created by RFRA and recognized in Hobby Lobby to avoid the obligations of cooperation required by the ACA-much like the earlier generation of privacy rights from the last quarter of the twentieth century, with which they share a strikingly common logic, give their holders rights to live separately, and differently, from the rest of us, freed from the obligations of otherwise shared norms of general applicability. They may thereby create separate communities of equals, within which individuals live free lives of brotherhood or sisterhood united by a common spiritual bond, or they may create separate sovereign spaces, within which powerful leaders wreck their wont, and submissive followers go along to get along and do what must be done. But whatever the quality of life or whatever the nature of the hierarchy within the sovereign spheres they create, exit rights quite explicitly, and with the Court's acquiescence, undermine webs of civic obligations that are otherwise owed by all and to all. They thereby undermine the basic communitarian assumption that underlies our democratic process-the assumption that we are engaged in a project of shared governance, according to which we all abide by the outcomes of democratically agreed upon solutions to common problems.
The vision of democracy these rights presuppose is profoundly less communitarian, and more fractured, than that. They bolster, at best, a pluralist rather than a unified conception of our polity-an aspiration of e pluribus pluribus rather than e pluribus unum-and at worst a balkanized federation of separate sovereignties, within which the powerful are unchecked by law and oftentimes even shielded from social or political critique. As such, exit rights seem perfectly designed to undergird the "cultural war" metaphor for our current politics. They validate a vision of social life in which the sides to the various disputes that divide us are committed to either the destruction or marginality of the other, rather than to an engagement with it, through dialogue, debate, and ultimately through compromise and cooperation on tentatively shared goals embodied in decently passed legislation of general applicability. That rending of a unified social fabric is the hidden but substantial cost of all exit rights, including, perhaps quintessentially, the institutional "Freedom of the Church" articulated in Hosanna-Tabor, and defended and celebrated in this volume of essays.
The core of my objection that freedom, then, is just this: we should remember that what is jettisoned when we enshrine the "Freedom of the Church" in the constitutional canon is not, per Justice Roberts, just the occasional right of employees in ministerial positions in church-affiliated places of employment to a remedy for their wrongful discharge. What is jettisoned, rather, is the aspiration of a civil rights society in a much larger sense. It is the aspiration for an understanding of rights as being rights to enter rather than rights to exit-rights to be included, and to participate in all aspects of our social, civic, and constitutional identity. When we set aside our civil rights to enter in order to make room for a Church's freedom to exit, we are setting aside not only a particular litigant's right to relief for a wrongful discharge, but also a particular conception of our rights tradition. We are setting aside an understanding of rights and a history of rights that seeks to secure, on behalf of every one of us, entry into the socially and legally constructed civic worlds of work, school, commerce, family, the public square, the courthouse, and neighborhood.
We jettison, when we set that aspiration aside, a conception of rights that says to the rights holder, by virtue of your rights, you can do this job. This shutting down of the civil rights aspiration-an aspiration of inclusion and belonging, particularly in those spheres of life which contribute so mightily to the enjoyment of our individual capabilities for living a good life, as guaranteed by laws which have been dearly fought for, won, and treasured-is a profound, misguided, and I believe, a tragic compromise of the promise of our civil society. An awareness of the magnitude of that tragedy, I believe, is disappointingly missing from both the Court's opinion in Hosanna-Tabor, as well as from a number of the essays in this worthy collection that celebrate that decision.
